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Abstract 
Much research has gone into the effects of oil and other natural resources on growth in which 
political institutions are often seen as the link between the two. Since institutions are difficult 
to measure and change very slowly over time, the analysis has largely been confined to cross-
country comparisons, most frequently investigating the effects on levels of democracy. This 
paper builds on recent analyses of the effects of oil endowments, prices and exports on 
democracy to examine the effects on several different types of institutional change, making 
use of panel data on over 100 countries between 1975 and 2005 wherever possible. The 
results distinguish between three characteristics of oil endowments which may also serve as 
channels through which their effects on the different institutions are realized. These include 
wealth, experience in the industry, and rents per unit of the resource exploited and reveal 
some findings which seem to depart sharply from conventional ones. Above all, they indicate 
the diversity in effects of oil on institutional change from one institution to another as well as 
according to the timing of the industry’s development and the magnitude of the endowment in 
each individual country.     
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I. Introduction  
The popular proposition that a large natural resource endowment constitutes a “curse” on 
growth and development or more broadly on human welfare has been examined rather 
extensively both theoretically and empirically. Some remarkably robust empirical results were 
presented by Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) in defense of the proposition and by numerous 
others since then (e.g., among the most notable Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006 and 
Ross,1991, 2012). Yet, others have pointed out that the effects of the resource endowments may 
differ depending on the type of natural resource, the way it is measured, the time period, 
according to their location-specificity or other factors (Mavrotas et al 2006; Pessoa, 2010) and 
the extent to which endogeneity, omitted variables, measurement error and other sources of 
estimation bias have been satisfactorily treated (Brunnschweiler and Bulte,2008; van der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke, 2010; Tsui 2011; van der Ploeg, 2011).  
A further complication is that the relation may not be a very direct one, but rather one 
that accrues indirectly through a number of different but potentially important links. In his 
comprehensive review of the subject, van der Ploeg (2011) identified seven different links, at 
least six of which were clearly institutional in nature. These were property rights, the incentives 
or disincentives to accumulate human and physical capital, the ability to control volatility in 
economic activity, quality of governance, the ability to ward off conflicts, and corruption.
1
  
As explained in Section II below, in view of the extremely slow pace of change typical of 
most institutions
2
, the vast majority of studies on these links have concentrated on a single link, 
                                                        
1
 The seventh link was composed of the relative price effects emanating from oil or other natural resource booms 
that have been examined in the Dutch disease literature. Even in this case, one could think of institutions such as 
immigration policy, tax and expenditure policies and institutional arrangements which might be used to diminish or 
offset this effect (Corden 1984).  
2
 Note for example the several centuries that it has taken even the more highly developed countries of the world to 
make the transition from autocracy or closed order to a democratic or open order according to North, Wallis and 
Weingast (2009). 
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namely, democratic governance, and have relied on international cross section analysis, relating 
oil or other natural resource endowments to the quality of institutions (usually a democracy 
index) at a point in time. Some exceptions to this generalization will be discussed below.    
Meanwhile, the institutions and development literature has made numerous 
demonstrations about how success and failure in economic growth can be explained in terms of 
differences in the quality of prior and predetermined institutions (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001, Nunn 2005 and in this context Perroa, 2008). Our objective therefore, is to 
examine whether or not oil can raise or lower institutional quality indicators of the type that may 
serve as important links between resource endowments and growth and development. Thus, 
instead of examining the relationship between levels of resource endowments and levels of 
institutional quality or the way in which the quality of institutions affect the effect of the 
resources on growth, we wish to test for effects of oil on institutional change. Because of the 
multiplicity of important links such as those identified above, we deem it important to examine 
effects on changes in a number of institutional characteristics going well beyond democracy that 
has been quite frequently investigated in the past. In particular, we aim to examine the effects of 
oil on bureaucratic quality, corruption, law and order, resistance to ethnic tension, internal and 
external conflicts, government stability, property rights and various other political institutions. 
Second, in that connection, we wish to examine the sensitivity of these institutional outcomes to 
alternative measures of resource dependence, the magnitude of oil endowments, the amount of 
time the country has had (a) since independence, (b) since first discovering oil and (c) since its 
peak discovery of oil, and to possible interactions among these considerations. These are all 
factors that have been suggested as being relevant either to institutional change or more properly 
measuring oil and other resource endowments.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the relevant 
literature.  Section III develops our empirical model, estimation strategy and identifies the data. 
Section IV presents our results and Section V provides our conclusion including suggestions for 
further research.  
 
II. Literature Review  
Our review of literature is divided into three subsections. Section A discusses each of the 
alleged links between natural resource endowments and the alleged “growth curse”, pointing to 
role of institutional factors and possible complementarities between them in either re-enforcing 
or undermining these links. Section B identifies and critiques of some existing empirical studies 
along these lines. Section C identifies some remaining question of relevance to the issues to be 
addressed in our empirical analysis.  
 
A. The Links and Complementary Institutions   
The seven most commonly identified links between natural resource endowments and 
allegedly adverse growth outcomes were identified in Section I above. Seldom if ever, however, 
do any of these links from natural resources to  growth  occur necessarily and indeed  almost 
every analyst has recognized the existence of important, even if relatively rare, cases of countries 
well-endowed with oil and other natural resources that have been very successful in growth and 
development. Among these were the United States and a few European countries in the last 
century or two (Libecap 1976) and more recently Canada and Norway among developed 
countries and Botswana, Chile and the United Arab Emirates among developing countries 
(Fasano 2002, van der Ploeg 2011).  
 
 
4 
 
In some cases, ways of escaping the curse are identified in the theoretical models 
themselves. For example, in the Dutch disease model of Corden and Neary (1982) considerable 
attention was given to how the model might work differently in different environmental 
conditions. The key idea is that with a fixed labor force, a booming resource sector will pull 
some labor away from the other tradable goods sector (agriculture or industry) which, together 
with the demand effect from the boom, raise output and employment in the non-traded goods 
sector as well as the price of non-tradables and hence the real exchange rate. This causes (among 
other things) de-industrialization and lack of competitiveness. Most notably, however, it was 
shown by Corden (1984) that in a variant of the model in which the assumption of a fixed labor 
supply was relaxed by allowing for substantial immigration of labor (as characteristic of Dubai 
and several other countries of the Persian Gulf in recent years), this Dutch disease effect could be 
entirely avoided.
3
  
Similarly, when economies of scale, technological changes, linkages and other 
externalities are allowed for in more dynamic models of natural resource industries, it becomes 
even easier to generate cases in which the effects of natural resource endowments on growth and 
development might vary considerably across countries, with favorable outcomes in some of them 
(Maloney, 2007; Wright and Czelutsta, 2004; and Blomstrom and Kokko, 2007). Often whether 
or not the curse can be avoided depends on the character of complementary institutions. For 
example, in countries where autocrats are in power, oil revenues might well allow these autocrats 
to remain in power longer than they otherwise would without having to invest in important 
infrastructure and education to raise incomes and welfare of the citizens. The continued 
empowerment of the existing autocrats would further contribute to rent-seeking activities within 
                                                        
3
 Labor inflows were often important historically in the US, Australia and some Latin American countries in the 
wake of the discovery of gold, silver or other minerals.  
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their narrow elites (e.g., Acemoglu, 1995, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a, 2006b). Indeed, a 
very popular theme has been to show that the effects of resource dependence on development are 
more adverse in countries with less democracy or weaker governance in general (e.g., Elbadawi 
and Soto, 2012).  
So, too, many if not all of the other links giving rise to adverse effects on growth can be 
nullified or at least mitigated by some other offsetting favorable institution. For example, the 
volatility effect of natural resource dependence can be eliminated with appropriate institutions 
related to fiscal and monetary policies such as strict controls on government spending during 
booms and contractionary monetary policy as might be obtained with central bank independence 
or the strict application of monetary rules.  
Similarly, Libecap (1976) and Wright and Czelusta (2004) showed how in the US 
governments did not declare property rights in minerals and oil for themselves or even public 
ownership. More recently, Norway in oil, and Botswana in diamonds, have invested in, or 
teamed up with, private firms making efficient use of these resources.  Norway has even become 
a pioneer in the development of schemes like sovereign wealth funds designed to save substantial 
shares of resource revenues and invest them for diversification as well as stabilization purposes 
elsewhere at home or abroad in line with investment opportunities.  
Still another example of complementarity among these various institutional links is that 
pointed out by Aslaksen (2010) between non-democracy and conflict links. Since Hegre et al. 
(2001) and others have shown that civil conflict is more likely to arise in countries that are semi-
democratic (presumably because they are less stable than either autocracies or democracies), the 
fairly well documented link between oil and  lack of democracy is complementary to the conflict 
link, in this case leading to fulfillment of the curse.       
 
 
6 
 
Whereas it may be true that corruption and rent-seeking are commonly correlated with 
natural resource endowments, sometimes appropriate institutions have developed and that would 
help natural resource countries mitigate these problems. For example, internally, a strong well-
disciplined bureaucracy may develop so as to assure the efficient delivery of needed government 
services without corruption and regardless of adverse external shocks as has occurred in 
Malaysia. Resource-rich Indonesia has gradually improved the quality of its governance and with 
that it has improved the effectiveness of government and managed to avoid both the volatility 
and exchange rate appreciation (and de-industrialization) effects. Chile has managed to decrease 
its vulnerability to volatility and under-saving through careful management of its copper 
revenues and generally good governance. Peru is reported to have recently been strengthening 
the protection of private property rights with respect to its natural resources with favorable 
consequences (van der Ploeg, 2011, p.369.)  
In recent years especially, external organizations and institutions have also come to play a 
positive role in mitigating some of the adverse effects of natural resources that operate through 
one or more of the links identified above in the countries hosting these resources. Indeed, various 
NGOs have fostered treaties to which resource countries can sign onto to increase transparency 
in the origin of natural resource exports and make it possible to prohibit trade of those resources 
coming to markets from illicit sources. For example the NGO Global Witness has fostered the 
“Publish What You Pay” protocol to encourage both the firms using or exploiting these resources 
to make public how much they pay to governments and governments and other suppliers to 
report exactly what they receive from the resource users. The quite new Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative scheme goes beyond encouraging firms to disclose such information to 
actually forcing them to do so as a condition for membership. Financial markets in some 
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countries are also considering whether or not and how to force full disclosure of this sort by 
firms marketing or processing such resources for the right to have their shares traded in these 
financial centers.
4
 If successful, these efforts could reduce the abilities and incentives for rebel 
groups to both contribute to the plundering of these resources and to conduct military campaigns 
against legitimate governments, and to reduce the ability of government leaders of oil exporting 
countries to siphon off oil revenues to private bank accounts abroad.        
  These examples would seem to suggest that each and every one of the links from natural 
resource endowments to the growth curse could be offset by, favorable institutions designed to 
deal with the problems identified. Among these would be a strong and effective bureaucracy to 
implement policies in the face of adverse shocks, an independent and strong judiciary to enforce 
contracts, even those between the private sector and government agencies, the strengthening of 
governance in ways that might encourage government leaders to control corruption or increase 
the credibility of policy pronouncements.  
 
B. Relevant Empirical Studies and their Methodological Shortcomings 
  Some of the earliest studies on the resource curse are still some of the most relevant, with 
different authors producing empirical results differing sharply on the existence of an institutional 
link between oil and other natural resources and growth.  Sachs and Warner (1997), e.g., 
dismissed the connection to growth via institutions by showing that there was little or no effect 
of resource endowment on institutional quality (in level terms), whereas the results obtained by 
Mehlum et al (2006a,b) led them to conclude that “institutions are decisive for the resource 
curse”. Specifically, they found that, thanks to a positive and relatively large interaction term 
                                                        
4
 For example, this is one of the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
signed into law in the U.S. in July, 2010 but not yet fully implemented.  
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between oil and  good institutions, natural resources can have positive impacts on growth when 
institutions are “good” (i.e., producer-friendly) but negative ones when they are “bad” (grabber-
friendly).  Since those authors used an aggregate measure (the unweighted average of the same 
numerous and widely varying International Country Risk Guide indexes that we use in this 
study), that approach makes it impossible to identify the specific institution that matters (for 
them) most for growth or for us the ones  that are most affected by natural resources.  
Another set of empirical studies  has investigated  the aforementioned alleged  link that 
occurs by way of  relative prices and intersectoral factor movements that would  favor non-
traded goods and thereby shift resources out of the traded goods sector (either agriculture or 
manufacturing) into non-traded goods as in the theoretical models of Corden and Neary, 1982; 
and  Corden, 1984). In particular, Harding and Venables (2010), Ismail (2010), and Brahmbatt et 
al. (2010) have recently provided results supporting this link, suggesting that resource booms 
divert resources from their areas of comparative advantage into the non-traded goods sectors.   
But the results of these and many other studies on these links may also be open to 
challenge on methodological grounds.  One of these bases of challenge is the omitted variable 
bias since many of these studies are based on international cross section analysis where one 
cannot control for that bias, even at the very least by including country fixed effects. Indeed, 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) show that, because resource dependence may be correlated with 
unobserved country characteristics, when one uses panel data and allows for country fixed 
effects, the negative effects of natural resources on growth of resource dependence disappear. 
Another basis of challenge is endogeneity of the natural resource dependence measures used in 
such studies that derives from the fact that the exploitation of such resources requires income and 
investment that in many cases may be touched off by local consumption or use. As a result, 
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natural resource exploitation and use can be the result of income, consumption and investment 
and hence is by no means exogenous to the examination of resource dependence effects on 
income, investment and growth.  
There are some studies that avoid some of these problems by taking advantage of natural 
or other experiments. For example, Caselli and Michaels (2009) make use of Brazilian data at the 
municipality level wherein the decision to drill for oil in that municipality is made strictly by a 
single decision maker, namely, the national oil company Petrobras and where the municipality 
has provided a substantial share of the oil revenues generated by the production in that 
municipality. The strength of this test was attributable to the fact that the revenues generated at 
the municipality level were very large for those municipalities in which offshore oil was 
discovered. Yet, the study found remarkably little effect of these revenue transfers, a result that 
was attributable to corruption on the part of the mayors of the municipalities. But, one could 
easily suspect that, in an institutional context with much greater transparency and informational 
access, the extent of corruption could be much less serious..       
The  early empirical studies on corruption making use of  international cross-section data, 
e.g.,  Mauro (1995) and Ades and di Tella (1999),  provided support for this link in the form of 
more natural resources, more corruption. With their panel data set, however, Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler (2010) showed that corruption is increased only in countries that have seldom 
experienced democratic government over the period under consideration. But, Haber and 
Menaldo (2008) pointed out that such results may not be valid unless there is sufficient variation 
over time not only in corruption but also in governance. Nevertheless,  using municipality data 
on oil revenue windfalls in Brazil, Brollo et al (2010) showed that oil windfalls at the 
municipality level were followed by increases in both corruption and the ability of incumbents to 
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remain in office longer (an outcome they attributed in part to discouragement of high quality 
opposition candidates). Caselli and Cunningham (2009) demonstrate that, even so, a variety of 
outcomes may be forthcoming depending on the farsightedness and other preference 
characteristics of the autocrat. This might be more likely when individuals or firms may obtain 
private property rights in these resources. Hence, the character and strength of property rights 
may be a key institution for distinguishing good and bad outcomes of natural resources.  
Two other links between natural resource dependence and growth (or the lack thereof) 
that have been frequently suggested and at least partially supported empirically are: (1) those 
arising from the undermining of social capital and leading to gangs, armed conflict, and costly 
civil and international wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 2005; Fearon, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Humphreys, 2005; and Miguel et al, 2004), and (2) those coming through the greater 
volatility of income, exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables that occurs in countries 
with high natural resource dependence (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Gylfason et al, 1999; Aghion et 
al, 2009). Considerable empirical support is provided for one or the other of these links (El 
Anshasy 2012).  
Another issue that has increasingly been identified in critiques of empirical studies on the 
effects of natural resources like oil on institutions is that some of the most common measures of 
resource dependence are potentially endogenous. This issue is deemed to be especially relevant 
in trying to answer the following question which is the primary objective of this paper:  Can a 
country’s initial resource endowment have an effect on its subsequent institutional indicators? In 
particular, can a country that starts out with weak institutions but large endowments of natural 
resources close the institutional gap between themselves and countries with initially superior 
institutions or will that gap grow even wider over time?   
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As suggested above, the few studies that have attempted to answer this question, e.g., 
Barro (1999), Ross (2001, 2012), and Aslaksen (2011), have attempted to answer it for but one 
institutional indicator, namely democracy. Most of these studies have demonstrated a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between oil or natural resource exports and democracy. 
But Herb (2005), Alexeev and Conrad (2009), and Haber and Menaldo (2007) have criticized 
these results on the grounds of possible endogeneity of the exports measure of natural resource 
dependence. They argue (1) that such exports are dependent on consumption and income which 
may also be correlated with democracy and, (2) since the initial income variable would normally 
be for a date subsequent to the discovery of oil, this too would contribute to endogeneity. Using 
oil production per capita (instead of as a share of GDP) as the measure of oil dependence, they 
found that the deleterious effect on democracy was no longer significant. Natural resource rent 
per capita is clearly a better measure because it subtracts out production costs, thus more 
properly reflecting the luck of having higher quality resources or resources that can be extracted 
at lower cost. Hence this measure eliminates much of the effort needed to take advantage of the 
resource which is the endogenous element (see especially Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and 
Elbadawi and Soto (2012)).   
But as Tsui (2011) pointed out, because of geological and pumping capacity constraints, 
even oil production per capita is unlikely to be either exogenous or to provide  sufficient 
variation over time. The stock of natural resources per capita may be more exogenous than 
production or exports but since that stock would represent the present value of resources that 
have been explored and identified and at least partly exploited, even these are not entirely 
exogenous. Notably,  Cotet and Tsui (2010) and Ross (2012) pointed out that natural resource 
countries had higher population growth than other countries, implying that the resource curse on 
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per capita growth would look worse than that on total growth and would also be affected by 
whether or not resources are measured on a per capita basis. Tsui (2011) uses a still more 
exogenous measure- economically recoverable reserves - as an instrument for the present value 
of natural resource rents and, when he does so, he finds that the otherwise negative effect on 
growth via the volatility link disappears.  
In a further effort to reduce endogeneity concerns, because of the inherent riskiness of the 
outcome of oil field exploration, Tsui (2011) makes use of the timing of peak discovery, the 
characteristics of the oil discovered and the costs of extracting in his measure of oil dependence.
5
 
He uses two stock measures of oil wealth- the amount of oil discovered to date (Discovered), and 
the amount originally in place (Endowment). Discovered is found to be positively related to 
Endowment (hardly a surprising finding), but not related to the preceding change in democracy. 
Then, the change in democracy after the peak discovery is regressed on Discovered, the level of 
democracy before the peak year of discovery and the interaction between these two variables. 
While the estimation is limited to a pure cross-section of 132 countries, the results showed that 
Discovered had a significant negative effect on the change in the democracy index, as did the 
level of democracy before the peak. On the other hand, the interaction term between the two had 
a positive and significant effect. These findings, moreover, survived a whole series of robustness 
tests. Nevertheless, despite the ingenuity of the approach in dealing with endogeneity, because of 
the relatively limited number of controls, many unmeasured influences, and without the use of 
country fixed effects, as the author himself stated, the results are subject to qualifications.   
                                                        
5
 The emphasis on peak discovery and exploitation builds on earlier work by Hubbert (1982), and Cambell (2005) 
on the geological approach to oil production and pricing from the technological one of Deffeyes (2005). Indeed, 
Benes et al (2012) show that increases in production after the peak are likely to be smaller than before the peak and 
at the world level the ability to satisfy growing demand is likely to come at the cost of increasing price. These 
authors model production, demand and price in the world oil market over time and argue that the geological 
approach in which peak production plays a role explains the time path of oil and gas production more accurately 
than the more technology and economics based models.     
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In any case, these recent studies by Tsui and others make clear that empirical estimates of 
the effects of oil and other natural resources on growth or institutions may be rather sensitive to 
the measure of natural resource used.  
 
C. Remaining Questions 
As should be clear from the above review, given the alleged importance of the 
institutional link between natural resources and growth and the multiplicity of the institutions 
that may be relevant to whether or not any such link results in curse effects, it would seem 
important to investigate the effects on a wide variety of institutions not simply democracy as in 
most existing studies. It should also be clear that for the long run, it is insufficient to examine the 
effects on the levels of the various institutional measures. The main question that we address in 
this paper, therefore, is (1) “To what extent do natural resource endowments affect changes in 
the institutional measures?” The secondary questions are: (2) “To what extent these effects differ 
from one type of institution to another?” and in view of the aforementioned potential 
endogeneity of the commonly used measures of natural resources, (3) “To what extent do the 
answers to the above questions differ according to the particular measure of natural resources? In 
answering question (3) we wish to take advantage of some of the newer and possibly more 
exogenous measures of natural resources proposed by Tsui (2011) and others.      
While the preceding literature review has referred to that on all kinds of natural 
resources, several studies have identified oil as the natural resource with the potentially most 
deleterious effects on institutions: property rights, internal and external conflicts, corruption, 
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volatility and especially democracy.
6
 For this reason in the following sections our focus will be 
strictly on oil.   
 
III. Methodology and Data  
To study the long run effect of oil on institutions, we use the following model specification 
for our baseline estimations 
)dencece_Indepen(Years_Sinβ)(OilβnInstitutioββ)iond(Institut i,ti,ti,toi,t 939291 lnln      
     titi ,        (1)
 
The dependent variable is the change (difference) of the institutional indicator during each 10 
year period (1986-95 and 1996- 2005, and in some cases consider 1976-1985). Among the 
explanatory variables we include the initial value of the institutional indicator, a particular 
measure of oil production or rent, ln(oili,t-9), years since independence at the beginning of the 
period, ln(yr_sinceindependencei,t-9), and for country ( i) and time fixed effects ( t).
7
 i,t 
represents the error term for country i in period t. Our model will be estimated as an unbalanced 
panel using available observations from 140 countries (of which about 115 countries are 
included in most estimations). We estimate the model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with 
robust standard errors. 
 Our measures for each of the aforementioned dependent variables are taken from two 
main datasets, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) from the Political Risk Group 
(2010) and Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2010). The  institutional indicators taken from the ICRG 
dataset are those for: 1) composite risk, 2) bureaucratic quality, 3) corruption, 4) law and order, 
                                                        
6
 See, e.g., Bulte et al (2005) and Pessoa (2009)   
7
 Where the lag (initial value) is designed to mitigate endogeneity. Coefficients and standard errors for country and 
time dummies are not included in tables for the purpose of brevity.  
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5) democracy, 6) ethnic tension, 7) external conflict, 8) internal conflict, 9) government stability, 
10) investment profile, and 11) socio-economic conditions. Since this source of data goes back 
only to 1985, for these dependent variables we are able to estimate equation (1) for only two 
periods, 1985-95 and 1995-2005.. The institutional indicators taken from the Polity IV dataset 
are:  1) democracy (polity), 2) regulations on the recruitment of the executive (xrreg), and 3) 
constraints on the executive (xconst). Since the Polity IV measures date back further than those 
of the ICRG, for them we can estimate equation (1) for three ten year periods. For comparability 
purposes, each of these measures of the dependent variables is re-scaled so as to provide values 
in the 0-100 range and then used to compute both the changes and initial values).
8
 All 
institutional indicators are constructed in such a way that higher values represent higher quality 
institutions. 
 For our measures of the natural resource oil, we explore three different indicators: 1) oil 
exports as a share of GDP, 2) oil rents, and 3) oil net exports per worker. Oil exports as a share 
of GDP is the most commonly used indicator when looking at the impact of resource abundance 
(e.g., Sachs and Warner, 2001). Net exports of oil per worker is the alternative indicator of 
resource abundance proposed by Lederman and Maloney (2007) who argued  that this indicator  
better portrays resource dependence because some countries both import and export oil and  puts 
it on a per worker basis. Oil exports as a share of GDP and net exports of oil per worker were 
constructed by the authors using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI, World 
Bank, 2011) and the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE, 
2011).
9
 Our other measure, oil rents as a percentage of GDP, has become a popular indicator of 
resource dependence since it is estimated by subtracting off production cost, which better  reflect 
                                                        
8
 We rescale all dependent variables so that the range between 1 and 100, with the exception of the composite risk 
which is already in the 100 scale. Then the change of the rescaled variable is estimated for our dependent variable.  
9
 See Blanco and Grier (2012) for further explanation on how these indicators were constructed. 
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the profits  earned from the resource (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). This indicator was available 
from World Development Indicators (2011). The initial values of all the variables related to oil 
production are entered as natural logs in our model specification.
10
 
 Subsequent to the baseline model, we also make use of measures for 1) years since oil 
discovery, and in subsequent specifications, 2) years since the peak oil discovery, and 3) 
endowment. For years since oil discovery, the authors collected information about the year in 
which oil was discovered in the country, largely based on The World History of Oil and Gas 
(Geo-Help Inc, 2011).
11
 We take the natural log of the years since oil was discovered and use the 
number of years at the beginning of the period. Years since discovery peak (again measured in 
natural logs) relates to the number of years since that in which the country had its biggest oil 
discovery, and it is constructed using data provided by Tsui (2011).
12
 Data on endowment of oil 
was again provided by Tsui (2011). Because years since oil discovery and years since oil 
discovery peak are time variant, we enter them in the model by themselves separately. 
Subsequently, however, we also examine the effects of interactions of these time- varying 
indicators with each of our three oil production measures. Because endowment is time invariant, 
we only consider it only in interactive form, i.e., interacted with the relevant oil measure.
13
 
The final term in our baseline model is a control for years since independence (natural log, 
initial value), which was collected by the authors from the Central Intelligence Agency World 
                                                        
10
 When getting the natural log for non-positive numbers in this analysis, we truncate the series by getting the 
natural log of a number close to zero (natural log of 1E-10).  
11
 www.geohelp.net/world.html 
12
 To clarify about the initial value of the number of years since oil was discovered, we use the number of years 
since oil was discovered in 1986 for the observation that has as a dependent variable the change of the institutional 
indicator between 1986 and 1995. For example, if a country discovered oil in 1950, then the value for the number of 
years since oil was discovered for the observation that considers the change of an institutional variable between 
1986 and 1995 will be equal to 36 (1986-1950). The same applies for years since discovery peak and years since 
independence, which are mentioned next. 
13 Because of the inclusion of country fixed effects, it will not be appropriate to include time invariant 
variables in the right hand side. 
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Factbook (2011). Summary statistics on all these variables are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 
disaggregates some of the relevant variables into those for oil countries and non-oil countries.    
 
IV. Results  
Baseline 
Table 2 presents the coefficients and robust standard errors for the estimation of the 
baseline model using the different institutional indicators discussed above and the three different 
oil production indicators (one at a time). Recall that higher values of the dependent variable 
represent the percentage improvement in the quality of the institution in question. Thus, a 
positive sign for a coefficient of the independent variables in the model that uses bureaucratic 
quality as dependent variable means that the variable leads to greater bureaucratic quality. For 
the variable labeled as corruption, a positive sign could be interpreted as an improvement on the 
corruption front, i.e., as a reduction of corruption or an improvement in control of corruption.   
The rather consistently negative sign of the initial value of the level of the dependent 
variable shows that there is institutional convergence, where those countries with higher 
institutional quality tend to reflect smaller improvements in institutional quality. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of years since independence has a positive sign for the models that consider 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, law and order, and democracy as dependent variables. The 
positive sign of years since independence is as expected because countries that have more 
experience as autonomous entities are likely to develop institutions with higher quality. 
 When looking at the sign and significance of the coefficient of the oil indicators, oil does 
not seem to have consistent and statistically significant effects on all institutions. Indeed, oil 
exports as share of GDP is only statistically significant at the 5 percent level when ethnic tension 
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is the dependent variable, and it has a positive sign. Oil rent has a negative and significant effect 
at the 5 percent level on bureaucratic quality, and a marginally significant effect (at the 10 
percent level) on corruption and democracy. On the other hand, oil rent has a positive and 
significant effect at the 5 percent level on internal conflict. Oil net exports per worker has 
significant negative effects on both the regulation of recruitment of the executive and on 
executive constraints at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
Years since oil was discovered 
 We explore whether other factors associated with oil have a relevant effect on 
institutions, and include years since oil was discovered (Table 3). In the estimations that include 
oil exports as a share of GDP, oil exports continue to have a positive effect on (control of) ethnic 
tension (implying that oil exports lead to a decrease in ethnic tension) but has no significant 
effect on other institutional indicators. Interestingly, the years since oil discovery has a positive 
and significant effect at the 1 percent level on corruption (implying that with time since oil 
discovery, the control of corruption improves). On the other hand, years since oil was discovered 
has a negative significant effect at least at the 5 percent level on law and order, ethnic tension, 
and external conflict. 
In the estimations in Table 3, we observe that oil rents continues to have a negative 
significant effect at the 5 percent level on bureaucratic quality, and a marginally significant 
effect at the 10 percent level on democracy. Oil rents now also has a significant negative effect at 
the 5 percent on corruption. Years since oil discovery also has a significant negative effect on 
law and order and ethnic tension at the 5 percent level, and a marginally significant positive 
effect on regulation of recruitment of the executive. 
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Estimates in Table 3 also show that oil net exports per worker has a negative and 
statistically significant effect at the 5 percent level on constraints on the executive, and 
marginally significant negative effects at the 10 percent level on both polity and regulation of the 
recruitment of the executive. In these estimations, we also observe that years since oil discovery 
has a significant negative effect on law and order and ethnic tension at the 5 percent level, which 
was observed when we used the other alternative indicators of oil. Years since oil discovery has 
a positive significant effect on government stability at the 1 percent level. 
From these estimations, it is important to note that years since oil discovery seems to 
have a robust significant negative effect on law and order and ethnic tension. This is an 
interesting finding, suggesting that the longer the country has experience producing oil, rent-
seeking is likely to be ingrained in society, and will result in weaker law and order, and greater 
ethnic tensions. Note that this is a finding akin to that of Ross (2012) referred to in Section II and 
consistent with some of the theoretical models.  
 In Table 4 we present our estimates for a model that includes an interaction term between 
years since oil discovery with each of the oil production variables. When we interact oil exports 
as share of GDP and years since oil discovery, we seldom find significant effects of the 
interaction term (it being only marginally significant at the 10 percent level when using the 
variables from the Polity IV database). Oil exports as a share of GDP has once again a significant 
positive effect on ethnic tensions and now a negative effect on government stability at the 5 
percent level. The significance and sign of the years since discovery is very similar to those 
shown in Table 3, where it has a significant negative effect at the 5 percent level on both law and 
order and external conflict. The only difference is that years since oil discovery has a negative 
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significant effect on ethnic tension now only at the 10 percent, instead of as before at the 5 
percent level. 
 Again in Table 4 one can see that the effect of the interaction term of oil rents and years 
since oil discovery is significant at the 5 percent level and negative when bureaucratic quality 
and government stability are the dependent variables, and significant at the 10 percent level 
when composite risk, corruption, polity, regulation recruitment of the executive, and constraints 
on the executive are used. In this set of estimations, years since oil discovery also has negative 
and significant effects on law and order and ethnic tension at the 5 percent level.      
Estimates in Table 4 show that the interaction term of net oil exports per worker and 
years since oil discovery has a significant negative effect at least at the 5 percent level on 
democracy, ethnic tension, and internal conflict. This interaction term also has a positive 
significant effect on external conflict. The significance of net oil exports per worker is similar to 
those shown in Table 3, where the only difference is that it has a positive significant effect on 
internal conflict at the 5 percent level. For the years since oil discovery variable, the earlier 
results hold, wherein it has a significant negative effect at the 5 percent level on law and order 
and ethnic tension, and a positive significant effect on government stability. Years since oil 
discovery has now a significant negative effect on democracy at the 5 percent level. 
From the estimations that include the interaction term between the oil production 
indicators and years since oil discovery, we might conclude that there is not a robust effect of the 
interactive term, but that the effect of years since oil discovery on law and order is robust. Thus, 
it is not per se the levels of oil exports and rents that matter, but the number of years that the oil 
sector has been a part of the economy of a country, but this effect seems to be robust only when 
using law and order as dependent variable.  Results are also robust to some degree when using 
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ethnic tension as dependent variable, where the effect of years since discovery is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level in 5 out of 6 cases (significant at the 10 percent level for the one 
of the cases). It is important to emphasize from these results that the differences in the effects of 
all the variables from one dependent variable to another and even from one measure of resource 
dependence to another vary significantly. The effect of years since discovery also varies 
considerably from one institutional measure to another. 
 
Years since oil discovery peak 
Next we explore the effects of years since the peak oil discovery on changes in the 
different institutional indicators. From the results in Table 5, we note that when using oil exports 
as a share of GDP, we find that oil exports only has a positive and significant effect on ethnic 
tension (5 percent level), while years since oil discovery peak has negative and significant effects 
at least at the 5 percent level on composite risk, bureaucratic quality, law and order, external 
conflict, investment profile, and socioeconomic conditions. Years since discovery peak also has 
a marginally significant negative effect on government stability at the 10 percent level. 
When using oil rents (Table 5), we find that oil rents has a significant negative effect on 
corruption and bureaucratic quality at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Interestingly, oil 
rents has a positive significant effect at the 5 percent level on composite risk, external conflict, 
and internal conflict. Years since oil discovery peak also has a significant negative effect at least 
at the 5 percent level on composite risk, bureaucratic quality, law and order, external conflict, 
and socioeconomic conditions. 
Net oil  exports per worker has a significant negative effect at the 5 percent level on 
constraints on the executive and regulation of the recruitment of the executive, and a significant 
 
 
22 
 
negative effect at the 5 percent level on polity . Years since oil discovery peak also has a 
significant negative effect at least at the 5 percent level on composite risk, bureaucratic quality, 
law and order, external conflict, investment profile, and socioeconomic conditions. Years since 
discovery peak also has a negative and significant effect at the 10 percent level on government 
stability, but a positive and significant effect at the 10 percent level on regulation of the 
recruitment of the executive. From the set of estimations in Table 5, we conclude that years since 
oil discovery peak has a robust negative and significant effects at least at the 5 percent level on 
composite risk, bureaucratic quality, law and order, external conflict, investment profile, and 
socioeconomic conditions. 
In Table 6 we explore the effects when the interaction between the years since the oil 
discovery peak and each of the respective oil production measures.  When using oil exports as a 
share of GDP, the interaction term is not statistically significant in any case. When using oil 
rents, however, that same interaction term has a statistically significant negative at the 5 percent 
level effect on bureaucratic quality and a positive and significant one on corruption. When using 
corruption as dependent variable,  the effect of years since peak oil discovery is also positive and 
significant, but the effect of oil rents by itself is negative and significant (at the 5 percent level). 
The interaction term of years since peak oil discovery and net oil exports per worker has a 
statistically significant negative effect on internal conflict, but a positive significant effect on 
corruption, ethnic tension, and government stability (at least at the 5 percent level). We observe 
that for years since oil discovery peak and its interaction with the oil production variables there 
does not seem to be a robust effect since it is positive and negative in other cases. 
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Endowment 
Estimates of the model in which the interaction of oil endowment with our indicators of 
oil production is included are shown in Table 7. When we interact oil endowment with oil 
exports as a share of GDP, we observe that the interaction term has a positive significant effect at 
least at the 5 percent level on corruption, external conflict, and socioeconomic conditions. It also 
has a marginally significant positive effect at the 10 percent level on composite risk, law and 
order, ethnic tension, and investment profile. The interaction term has a negative and significant 
effect at the 5 percent level on democracy. 
The interaction term of oil endowment and rents has a positive significant effect at the 5 
percent level on composite risk and polity, but a negative significant effect on bureaucratic 
quality and investment profile at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The interaction term of 
oil endowment and net exports per worker has a positive significant effect at least at the 5 
percent level on bureaucratic quality, corruption, law and order, external conflict, investment 
profile, and socioeconomic conditions. This interaction term also has a positive significant effect 
at the 10 percent level on ethnic tension. We interpret the positive significant effect of the 
interaction term between oil endowment and oil production indicators as a wealth effect that has 
a positive effect on institutional quality. This is in contrast to the time oriented oil interaction 
effects years since discovery and years since peak that exert negative effects on many of the 
institutional change variables.  
 
V. Conclusion  
Our analysis contributes to the literature by doing a comprehensive study of the impact of 
oil on several indicators of institutional change and controlling for country and time effects for a 
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large set of countries. There are several interesting findings from our analysis. First, we do not 
find that oil has an effect on any of the institutional changes that is fully robust across the three 
different indicators of oil production. The analysis suggests that the impacts vary in magnitude, 
statistical significance and direction from one measure of institutional change to another. Indeed, 
depending on other aspects of the specification, the effects on reduction of ethnic tensions are 
frequently positive while those on democracy and polity are frequently negative.   
Second, our results suggest that the timing of discovery, the evolution of the industry and 
the magnitude of the oil endowment in our analysis are equally if not more important than the 
more commonly used oil export measures. In particular, years since oil discovery has an effect 
on some of the institutional variables, but not all. It seems to have a relatively robust significant 
negative effect on law and order, where the coefficient for years since oil discovery was 
significant in all 6 out of the 6 cases. It also seems to have a significant and fairly robust negative 
effect on ethnic tension since the coefficient was significant at least at the 5 percent level in 5 out 
of 6 cases (and significant at the 10 percent level for the remaining case). Given the 
aforementioned finding that oil exports by itself often has a positive effect on ethnic tension 
(reduction), these findings of negative effects of experience in the industry seem to show that the 
rent-seeking and other adverse effects may grow over time. This is in contrast to the general 
finding that the effects of years since independence of the country are generally positive on these 
and other institutional change variables. This negative effect of years since discovery on law and 
order is particularly striking.  
We find that years since oil discovery peak has a robust significant negative on composite 
risk, bureaucratic quality, law and order, external conflict, and socioeconomic conditions 
(significant at least at the 5 percent level is 6 out of 6 cases for each dependent variable 
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mentioned here). This finding is similar to what we found when using years since oil was 
discovered in the country. 
We find that the interaction of the magnitude of the oil endowment with the oil export or 
rent variable has some especially strong and diverse effects. This term may be more reflective of 
oil wealth rather than mere experience with production and exports. It sometimes further 
augments the direct effect of oil (as in the case when oil rent is the oil measure) and it has a 
negative effect on bureaucratic quality or a positive effect on polity, but in other cases (such as 
when the measure of oil is net exports per capita in its effect on external conflict) it offsets those 
effects.  
For further research, we would like to explore the impact of years since oil was 
discovered on other institutional indicators that relate to law and order such as property rights 
and individual freedom. We would like to explore the extent to which some of these influences 
could be picked up even within shorter periods of time like 5 year periods that would allow for 
more observations. Another extension would be to include other measure of the quality of the 
resource endowments available in the Peak Oil data set of Tsui. We could also explore the use of 
other estimators such as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), where we control for the 
possibility of correlation in the error terms. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Composite risk growth 247 6.2613 9.9162 -19.0833 34.4167 
Bureaucratic quality growth 249 1.0835 19.2865 -75.0000 55.2083 
Corruption growth 249 -5.7926 18.4470 -55.5556 66.6667 
Law and order growth 249 4.4344 22.4914 -41.6667 66.6667 
Democracy growth 249 5.0535 19.7093 -54.1667 58.3333 
Ethnic tension growth 249 4.0942 22.0243 -48.6111 83.3333 
External conflict growth 249 9.0687 23.4814 -50.0000 83.3333 
Internal conflict growth 249 8.5393 25.7482 -64.5833 84.7222 
Government stability growth 249 5.6225 17.8737 -53.4722 48.6111 
Investment profile growth 249 12.0092 21.0076 -33.3333 54.1667 
Socio-economic cond. growth 249 0.0669 15.9308 -41.6667 45.8333 
Polity growth 355 9.8028 24.4393 -70.0000 85.0000 
Regulation executive recruit growth 338 3.9448 16.7669 -66.6667 66.6667 
Executive constraint growth 338 7.0161 22.8539 -85.7143 85.7143 
Composite risk initial 247 62.5251 15.8242 25.2500 93.7917 
Bureaucratic quality initial 249 54.0663 30.5949 0.0000 100.0000 
Corruption initial 249 55.8958 23.4063 0.0000 100.0000 
Law and order initial 249 62.2490 26.3371 16.6667 100.0000 
Democracy initial 249 60.0234 25.7438 0.0000 100.0000 
Ethnic tension initial 249 66.5718 25.5240 0.0000 100.0000 
External conflict initial 249 77.3799 22.7462 0.0000 100.0000 
Internal conflict initial 249 72.4035 25.5140 0.0000 100.0000 
Government stability initial 249 56.5177 15.9316 8.3333 91.6667 
Investment profile initial 249 48.5553 14.4442 8.3333 91.6667 
Socio-economic conditions initial 249 48.5274 14.4760 8.3333 91.6600 
Polity initial 357 51.1205 38.3948 0.0000 100.0000 
Regulation executive recruit initial 348 79.5977 20.4519 33.3333 100.0000 
Executive constraint initial 348 57.2660 34.2536 14.2857 100.0000 
Years since independence initial* 420 1.3971 7.9083 -23.0259 6.7488 
Oil exports as GDP share initial* 326 -1.6047 4.8460 -23.0259 6.0928 
Oil rents as GDP share initial* 359 -10.1787 11.6797 -23.0259 4.2168 
Oil net exports per worker initial* 341 -15.5526 12.6561 -23.0259 9.8250 
Years since oil discovery* 420 -9.4251 13.3787 -23.0259 5.0106 
Years since oil discovery peak* 420 -0.8190 9.1932 -23.0259 4.9345 
Endowment 390 0.1750 0.4997 0.0000 3.3300 
Summary statistics for 140 countries in the years of 1985, 1995, and 2005. Growth denotes 
difference of the variable in the 10 year period (X1995 = X1995-X1986, X2005 = X2005-
X1996). Initial denotes initial value in the 10 year period (X1986 for observation in 1995, 1996 
for observation in 2005). “*” denotes natural logarithm. When getting natural log of negative 
values, we truncate variables to a number close to zero, ln(1E-10).  
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Table 2. Baseline Estimations 
Dependent variable Comp.risk Bur.qua. Corrupt. Law&ord. Democ. Eth. ten. Ext. con. Int. con. Gov. sta. Inv.prof. Socio.cond. Polity Xrreg Xconst 
Dependent variable -1.170*** -0.875*** -1.100*** -1.119*** -0.969*** -1.159*** -1.114*** -1.361*** -1.136*** -1.441*** -1.514*** -0.832*** -1.009*** -0.899*** 
   initial level (0.067) (0.102) (0.088) (0.067) (0.124) (0.073) (0.060) (0.099) (0.093) (0.093) (0.114) (0.091) (0.094) (0.094) 
Oil exports 0.0756 -0.224 -0.436 -0.181 -0.337 0.434** 0.0451 -0.213 -0.474 0.0682 -0.272 0.227 0.399 0.093 
  GDP share initial (0.112) (0.342) (0.346) (0.298) (0.484) (0.168) (0.240) (0.300) (0.317) (0.364) (0.389) (0.476) (0.325) (0.441) 
Years since 0.0028 0.388** 0.430*** 0.771*** 0.354** -0.965*** -1.162*** -0.0572 -0.339** 0.527* -0.412* 12.73* -0.347 7.071 
  indep. initial (0.041) (0.156) (0.149) (0.095) (0.166) (0.135) (0.130) (0.165) (0.140) (0.286) (0.229) (7.649) (3.486) (6.293) 
Constant 76.21*** 73.82*** 45.14*** 63.96*** 55.50*** 23.37*** 51.25*** 77.96*** 48.57*** 84.39*** 73.67*** 66.53*** 41.22** -13.84 
 (4.590) (10.700) (3.667) (5.021) (9.829) (2.984) (3.948) (6.551) (7.961) (10.280) (9.841) (10.330) (19.590) (33.130) 
Observations 216 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 300 293 293 
R-squared 0.908 0.742 0.847 0.928 0.726 0.902 0.930 0.908 0.861 0.871 0.727 0.662 0.733 0.684 
               
Dependent variable -1.176*** -0.895*** -1.111*** -1.123*** -1.013*** -1.152*** -1.086*** -1.331*** -1.153*** -1.444*** -1.398*** -0.845*** -0.957*** -0.900*** 
   initial level (0.060) (0.095) (0.090) (0.066) (0.115) (0.067) (0.054) (0.093) (0.091) (0.086) (0.103) (0.082) (0.099) (0.090) 
Oil rents 0.271 -0.686** -0.323* 0.146 -0.617* 0.182 0.272 0.714** -0.0757 -0.192 -0.442 0.345 -0.0547 0.306 
   initial (0.172) (0.268) (0.165) (0.215) (0.370) (0.348) (0.288) (0.356) (0.412) (0.211) (0.299) (0.292) (0.209) (0.257) 
Years since -0.008 0.376** 0.451*** 0.797*** 0.431*** -1.009*** -1.195*** -0.0826 -0.306* 0.534* -0.470** -1.219** -0.115 -0.966** 
  indep. initial (0.042) (0.153) (0.154) (0.106) (0.159) (0.133) (0.132) (0.169) (0.162) (0.272) (0.217) (0.499) (0.229) (0.440) 
Constant 82.76*** -17.77*** 31.76*** 71.34*** 17.59*** 89.75*** 94.45*** 116.4*** 97.08*** 99.99*** 56.84*** 9.873*** 64.29*** 85.67*** 
 (6.004) (6.146) (6.392) (4.386) (3.638) (4.671) (4.071) (7.329) (4.702) (3.785) (3.879) (2.636) (6.195) (10.630) 
Observations 238 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 327 313 313 
R-squared 0.904 0.755 0.834 0.919 0.735 0.900 0.931 0.910 0.855 0.877 0.737 0.672 0.718 0.693 
               
Dependent variable -1.150*** -0.898*** -1.086*** -1.114*** -1.001*** -1.142*** -1.104*** -1.356*** -1.118*** -1.422*** -1.537*** -0.817*** -0.997*** -0.890*** 
    initial level (0.067) (0.101) (0.096) (0.066) (0.115) (0.070) (0.059) (0.094) (0.081) (0.089) (0.110) (0.088) (0.093) (0.091) 
Oil net exports 0.051 -0.141 0.093 -0.113 -0.337 0.166 0.0265 0.162 0.243 0.0565 0.132 -0.294 -0.165* -0.425** 
   per worker initial (0.080) (0.301) (0.172) (0.115) (0.272) (0.203) (0.216) (0.108) (0.223) (0.133) (0.293) (0.190) (0.096) (0.195) 
Years since -0.0144 0.423*** 0.500*** 0.774*** 0.408** -1.000*** -1.182*** -0.0735 -0.332*** 0.475 -0.373 11.97* -0.17 6.141 
  indep. initial (0.041) (0.144) (0.158) (0.099) (0.163) (0.119) (0.127) (0.154) (0.117) (0.287) (0.230) (6.420) (3.060) (5.045) 
Constant 67.47*** 18.39*** 83.48*** 51.99*** 61.41*** 56.01*** 91.69*** 91.39*** 69.20*** 84.12*** 65.84*** 49.49*** 96.78*** -28.68 
 (4.556) (4.146) (9.605) (2.273) (8.820) (6.084) (6.412) (8.418) (5.288) (3.649) (5.967) (9.071) (18.360) (26.220) 
Observations 220 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 310 303 303 
R-squared 0.908 0.740 0.834 0.931 0.731 0.909 0.931 0.914 0.863 0.874 0.735 0.661 0.719 0.689 
               
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Unbalanced panel estimation with available observations for 140 
countries between the period 1985-2005.  Dependent variable is the 10 year growth rate (difference). All estimations include the initial value of the dependent variable (in levels).  
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  Table 3. Estimations with years since oil was discovered 
Dependent variable Comp.risk Bur.qua. Corrupt. Law&ord. Democ. Eth. ten. Ext. con. Int. con. Gov. sta. Inv.prof Socio.cond Polity Xrreg Xconst 
Dependent variable -1.170*** -0.876*** -1.107*** -1.116*** -0.973*** -1.156*** -1.115*** -1.361*** -1.125*** -1.434*** -1.522*** -0.840*** -1.013*** -0.903*** 
   initial level (0.068) (0.103) (0.089) (0.068) (0.125) (0.074) (0.060) (0.099) (0.097) (0.095) (0.123) (0.090) (0.092) (0.094) 
Oil exports 0.076 -0.222 -0.41 -0.186 -0.321 0.429** 0.0352 -0.212 -0.467 0.0696 -0.273 0.23 0.414 0.11 
  GDP share initial (0.113) (0.344) (0.351) (0.300) (0.484) (0.169) (0.238) (0.301) (0.319) (0.367) (0.390) (0.480) (0.327) (0.446) 
Years since 0.0282 0.124 1.431*** -0.252** 0.623 -0.301** -0.574*** 0.0477 0.431 0.276 -0.177 0.527 0.43 0.392 
  oil discovery (0.106) (0.260) (0.125) (0.111) (0.418) (0.148) (0.208) (0.187) (0.269) (0.217) (0.284) (0.370) (0.401) (0.411) 
Years since 0.00338 0.391** 0.461*** 0.763*** 0.373** -0.974*** -1.175*** -0.0556 -0.336** 0.525* -0.410* 12.78* -0.575 6.801 
  indep. initial (0.042) (0.159) (0.142) (0.096) (0.169) (0.134) (0.128) (0.168) (0.142) (0.286) (0.232) (7.656) (3.421) (6.265) 
Constant 76.85*** 76.82*** 79.11*** 57.91*** 70.53*** 16.31*** 37.71*** 79.09*** 57.96*** 90.36*** 70.02*** 65.11*** 52.12** -3.569 
 (4.458) (13.360) (5.211) (6.353) (14.960) (5.017) (6.407) (8.109) (7.940) (9.894) (8.610) (10.280) (20.790) (34.870) 
Observations 216 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 300 293 293 
R-squared 0.908 0.742 0.854 0.928 0.728 0.902 0.930 0.908 0.862 0.871 0.728 0.665 0.737 0.686 
                
Dependent variable -1.178*** -0.901*** -1.125*** -1.115*** -1.014*** -1.138*** -1.086*** -1.325*** -1.151*** -1.442*** -1.395*** -0.856*** -0.984*** -0.909*** 
   initial level (0.060) (0.095) (0.093) (0.067) (0.115) (0.068) (0.054) (0.095) (0.091) (0.087) (0.105) (0.082) (0.091) (0.090) 
Oil rents 0.255 -0.769*** -0.474** 0.219 -0.559* 0.317 0.295 0.772** -0.162 -0.222 -0.471 0.192 -0.257 0.175 
   initial (0.189) (0.241) (0.216) (0.219) (0.331) (0.323) (0.320) (0.370) (0.444) (0.244) (0.336) (0.295) (0.248) (0.275) 
Years since 0.077 0.416 0.736 -0.340** -0.29 -0.652** -0.115 -0.274 0.429 0.144 0.139 0.562 0.751* 0.503 
  oil discovery (0.121) (0.349) (0.463) (0.151) (0.529) (0.296) (0.291) (0.390) (0.281) (0.194) (0.225) (0.356) (0.407) (0.378) 
Years since -0.00475 0.394** 0.464*** 0.781*** 0.422** -1.034*** -1.198*** -0.101 -0.293* 0.536* -0.468** -1.212** -0.143 -0.979** 
  indep. initial (0.043) (0.154) (0.148) (0.106) (0.162) (0.127) (0.132) (0.174) (0.166) (0.271) (0.217) (0.490) (0.193) (0.428) 
Constant 84.29*** 82.90*** 79.43*** 93.69*** 90.38*** 61.17*** 100.2*** 121.2*** 65.15*** 96.16*** 83.48*** 99.26*** 82.51*** 79.37*** 
 (4.982) (9.137) (8.894) (6.220) (10.740) (3.342) (5.783) (8.606) (6.929) (4.347) (7.081) (11.490) (8.511) (10.250) 
Observations 238 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 327 313 313 
R-squared 0.905 0.756 0.837 0.919 0.735 0.902 0.931 0.910 0.856 0.878 0.737 0.677 0.731 0.696 
                
Dependent variable -1.152*** -0.899*** -1.095*** -1.109*** -1.001*** -1.134*** -1.104*** -1.357*** -1.116*** -1.422*** -1.541*** -0.823*** -0.998*** -0.892*** 
   initial level (0.067) (0.102) (0.097) (0.067) (0.116) (0.071) (0.059) (0.095) (0.081) (0.089) (0.112) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091) 
Oil net exports 0.0493 -0.142 0.0876 -0.11 -0.332 0.168 0.0263 0.161 0.24 0.0564 0.134 -0.334* -0.198* -0.460** 
   per worker initial (0.081) (0.302) (0.173) (0.114) (0.274) (0.202) (0.217) (0.109) (0.223) (0.133) (0.295) (0.192) (0.105) (0.203) 
Years since 0.212 0.0875 0.538 -0.254*** -0.573 -0.489*** 0.0337 0.0939 0.397*** 0.0331 -0.166 0.472 0.364 0.387 
  oil discovery (0.155) (0.131) (0.649) (0.077) (0.724) (0.145) (0.370) (0.110) (0.109) (0.223) (0.128) (0.323) (0.329) (0.312) 
Years since -0.00623 0.427*** 0.512*** 0.762*** 0.388** -1.019*** -1.181*** -0.0682 -0.320*** 0.475 -0.375 12.10* -0.273 6.000 
  indep. initial (0.041) (0.147) (0.155) (0.100) (0.166) (0.117) (0.128) (0.159) (0.119) (0.288) (0.232) (6.397) (3.043) (5.025) 
Constant 80.75*** 18.07*** 33.07*** 52.71*** 63.80*** 54.38*** 87.98*** 91.11*** 67.40*** 94.48*** 66.72*** -18.02** 105.1*** -19.81 
 (5.996) (4.185) (4.962) (2.212) (9.257) (5.297) (5.834) (8.384) (5.427) (4.626) (6.398) (8.162) (18.910) (27.260) 
Observations 220 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 310 303 303 
R-squared 0.910 0.740 0.836 0.932 0.734 0.910 0.931 0.914 0.864 0.874 0.735 0.664 0.722 0.691 
                              
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Unbalanced panel estimation with available observations for 140 
countries between the period 1985-2005.  Dependent variable is the 10 year growth rate (difference). All estimations include the initial value of the dependent variable (in levels). 
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Table 4. Estimations with years since oil was discovered and interaction term of years since oil discovery and oil 
Dependent variable Comp.risk Bur.qua. Corrupt. Law&ord. Democ. Eth. ten. Ext. con. Int. con. Gov. sta. Inv.prof Socio.cond Polity Xrreg Xconst 
Dependent variable -1.173*** -0.881*** -1.103*** -1.116*** -0.978*** -1.157*** -1.108*** -1.360*** -1.118*** -1.438*** -1.530*** -0.835*** -1.013*** -0.902*** 
   initial level (0.070) (0.106) (0.091) (0.068) (0.127) (0.074) (0.061) (0.102) (0.097) (0.096) (0.123) (0.090) (0.092) (0.094) 
Years since 0.0283 0.129 1.425*** -0.254** 0.63 -0.298* -0.577*** 0.0466 0.436 0.277 -0.186 0.469 0.41 0.359 
  oil discovery (0.103) (0.254) (0.136) (0.116) (0.404) (0.153) (0.193) (0.188) (0.273) (0.235) (0.291) (0.369) (0.403) (0.409) 
Oil exports 0.13 -0.0145 -0.769* -0.315 -0.0173 0.628** -0.281 -0.263 -0.826*** 0.444 0.0536 -0.841 -0.0809 -0.722 
  GDP share initial (0.193) (0.584) (0.457) (0.330) (0.595) (0.301) (0.316) (0.255) (0.265) (0.386) (0.484) (0.575) (0.231) (0.518) 
Interaction  0.0035 0.0135 -0.0237 -0.0085 0.0196 0.0131 -0.0207 -0.00336 -0.0236 0.0245 0.0214 -0.0579* -0.0272* -0.0457* 
  (year disc.*oil) (0.009) (0.028) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.015) (0.028) 
Years since 0.0046 0.394** 0.465*** 0.763*** 0.378** -0.974*** -1.183*** -0.0568 -0.340** 0.529* -0.403* 13.08* -0.515 6.93 
  indep. initial (0.042) (0.162) (0.140) (0.098) (0.172) (0.133) (0.132) (0.172) (0.146) (0.292) (0.238) (6.918) (3.351) (5.732) 
Observations 216 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 300 293 293 
R-squared 0.908 0.742 0.855 0.928 0.728 0.902 0.931 0.908 0.863 0.872 0.729 0.670 0.739 0.689 
Dependent variable -1.188*** -0.912*** -1.131*** -1.119*** -1.015*** -1.136*** -1.084*** -1.326*** -1.187*** -1.442*** -1.387*** -0.858*** -0.978*** -0.906*** 
   initial level (0.060) (0.095) (0.094) (0.068) (0.117) (0.067) (0.055) (0.096) (0.091) (0.087) (0.105) (0.081) (0.091) (0.090) 
Years since -0.0784 0.11 0.569 -0.436** -0.324 -0.890** -0.326 -0.398 -0.065 0.25 0.375* 0.151 0.318 0.118 
  oil discovery (0.144) (0.301) (0.532) (0.195) (0.596) (0.377) (0.200) (0.534) (0.209) (0.240) (0.220) (0.415) (0.464) (0.408) 
Oil rents 0.0383 -1.195*** -0.708*** 0.0785 -0.605* -0.00225 0.00636 0.600*** -0.831* -0.0768 -0.157 -0.178 -0.568** -0.103 
   initial (0.066) (0.311) (0.158) (0.236) (0.322) (0.366) (0.484) (0.202) (0.448) (0.265) (0.522) (0.281) (0.278) (0.312) 
Interaction  -0.0203* -0.0401** -0.0218* -0.0129 -0.00432 -0.0302 -0.0272 -0.0162 -0.0630** 0.0136 0.0298 -0.0404* -0.0363* -0.0324* 
  (year disc.*oil) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.019) (0.027) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) 
Years since -0.00037 0.401** 0.460*** 0.783*** 0.423** -1.035*** -1.201*** -0.0997 -0.268 0.536* -0.475** -1.214** -0.125 -0.964** 
  indep. initial (0.043) (0.153) (0.149) (0.107) (0.163) (0.127) (0.133) (0.175) (0.168) (0.273) (0.218) (0.492) (0.199) (0.432) 
Observations 238 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 327 313 313 
R-squared 0.908 0.759 0.838 0.919 0.735 0.903 0.932 0.910 0.865 0.878 0.740 0.680 0.737 0.698 
Dependent variable -1.154*** -0.900*** -1.097*** -1.107*** -1.005*** -1.137*** -1.102*** -1.358*** -1.116*** -1.418*** -1.538*** -0.823*** -0.998*** -0.893*** 
   initial level (0.068) (0.103) (0.098) (0.068) (0.117) (0.071) (0.059) (0.095) (0.081) (0.090) (0.113) (0.087) (0.091) (0.091) 
Years since 0.185 0.0433 0.359 -0.205** -1.028** -0.701*** 0.23 -0.0702 0.377*** 0.168 0.00534 0.299 0.132 0.145 
  oil discovery (0.177) (0.162) (0.533) (0.091) (0.425) (0.139) (0.252) (0.200) (0.130) (0.334) (0.228) (0.327) (0.290) (0.304) 
Oil net exports 0.05 -0.141 0.0917 -0.111 -0.319 0.174 0.0206 0.166** 0.241 0.054 0.129 -0.327* -0.188* -0.450** 
   per worker initial (0.078) (0.303) (0.192) (0.110) (0.264) (0.185) (0.216) (0.077) (0.222) (0.101) (0.279) (0.188) (0.104) (0.198) 
Interaction  -0.0026 -0.0043 -0.0176 0.0049 -0.0443** -0.0210*** 0.0191* -0.0161** -0.0019 0.013 0.0166 -0.0083 -0.0114 -0.012 
  (year disc.*oil) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Years since -0.006 0.427*** 0.507*** 0.762*** 0.383** -1.022*** -1.179*** -0.0697 -0.321*** 0.472 -0.374 12.11* -0.276 5.988 
  indep. initial (0.041) (0.148) (0.156) (0.100) (0.166) (0.119) (0.128) (0.160) (0.121) (0.290) (0.234) (6.393) (3.059) (5.019) 
Observations 220 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 310 303 303 
R-squared 0.910 0.740 0.837 0.932 0.741 0.911 0.932 0.914 0.864 0.875 0.737 0.664 0.723 0.691 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Unbalanced panel estimation with available observations for 140 
countries between the period 1985-2005.  Dependent variable is the 10 year growth rate (difference). All estimations include the initial value of the dependent variable (in levels). Coefficients and 
standard errors for constant not included for purpose of brevity. 
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Table 5. Estimations with years since oil discovery peak 
Dependent variable Comp.risk Bur.qua. Corrupt. Law&ord. Democ. Eth. ten. Ext. con. Int. con. Gov. sta. Inv.prof Socio.cond Polity Xrreg Xconst 
Dependent variable -1.181*** -0.885*** -1.101*** -1.126*** -0.974*** -1.166*** -1.122*** -1.361*** -1.156*** -1.438*** -1.508*** -0.834*** -1.017*** -0.896*** 
   initial level (0.068) (0.102) (0.089) (0.069) (0.126) (0.075) (0.059) (0.099) (0.099) (0.094) (0.113) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Oil exports 0.088 -0.188 -0.434 -0.17 -0.322 0.442*** 0.0751 -0.215 -0.464 0.0733 -0.248 0.219 0.376 0.0608 
  GDP share initial (0.113) (0.337) (0.347) (0.297) (0.487) (0.167) (0.233) (0.301) (0.317) (0.365) (0.389) (0.481) (0.331) (0.435) 
Years since -0.253** -0.964*** -0.0614 -0.315*** -0.3 -0.28 -0.865*** 0.058 -0.320* -0.207** -0.786*** 0.134 0.229 0.239 
  oil discovery peak (0.110) (0.133) (0.480) (0.097) (0.287) (0.254) (0.159) (0.305) (0.166) (0.100) (0.136) (0.265) (0.162) (0.254) 
Years since 0.004 0.378** 0.429*** 0.771*** 0.353** -0.968*** -1.168*** -0.0567 -0.330** 0.520* -0.431* 13.06 0.223 7.76 
  indep. initial (0.042) (0.155) (0.150) (0.096) (0.166) (0.138) (0.134) (0.166) (0.143) (0.286) (0.225) (7.958) (3.582) (6.654) 
Constant 71.30*** 52.28*** 43.73*** 57.43*** 48.83*** 17.25*** 31.49*** 79.24*** 42.59*** 79.34*** 54.89*** 66.00*** 36.64* -18.55 
 (4.521) (10.870) (11.700) (3.697) (9.914) (6.075) (5.313) (8.699) (6.833) (11.070) (10.430) (11.920) (19.930) (36.340) 
Observations 216 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 300 293 293 
R-squared 0.910 0.749 0.847 0.928 0.727 0.902 0.933 0.908 0.862 0.871 0.734 0.662 0.737 0.687 
                              
Dependent variable -1.188*** -0.902*** -1.110*** -1.130*** -1.013*** -1.160*** -1.095*** -1.330*** -1.175*** -1.443*** -1.395*** -0.844*** -0.966*** -0.901*** 
   initial level (0.060) (0.095) (0.091) (0.066) (0.116) (0.068) (0.053) (0.094) (0.100) (0.087) (0.104) (0.084) (0.100) (0.089) 
Oil rents 0.383** -0.510* -0.349** 0.259 -0.619 0.278 0.554*** 0.803** 0.0199 -0.165 -0.287 0.351 -0.101 0.277 
   initial (0.149) (0.283) (0.176) (0.208) (0.427) (0.363) (0.134) (0.398) (0.457) (0.237) (0.330) (0.298) (0.222) (0.270) 
Years since -0.467*** -0.718*** 0.107 -0.475*** 0.00614 -0.403 -1.153*** -0.364 -0.394 -0.112 -0.638** -0.0266 0.189 0.134 
  oil discovery peak (0.098) (0.267) (0.378) (0.172) (0.275) (0.386) (0.133) (0.223) (0.318) (0.181) (0.256) (0.258) (0.163) (0.253) 
Years since -0.011 0.368** 0.454*** 0.793*** 0.431*** -1.014*** -1.204*** -0.0891 -0.297* 0.530* -0.483** -1.226** -0.0685 -0.924** 
  indep. initial (0.043) (0.153) (0.155) (0.106) (0.160) (0.136) (0.134) (0.170) (0.164) (0.273) (0.217) (0.497) (0.228) (0.443) 
Constant 75.55*** 24.74*** -1.105 102.5*** 52.74*** 43.69*** 103.3*** 48.94*** 53.86*** 43.80*** 6.593 15.79** 62.89*** 35.16*** 
 (4.088) (2.522) (7.985) (7.889) (15.270) (11.190) (5.721) (11.070) (13.330) (6.254) (8.452) (7.195) (6.361) (9.009) 
Observations 238 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 327 313 313 
R-squared 0.909 0.758 0.834 0.920 0.735 0.900 0.936 0.910 0.856 0.878 0.741 0.672 0.720 0.693 
                              
Dependent variable -1.162*** -0.904*** -1.087*** -1.120*** -1.003*** -1.152*** -1.121*** -1.356*** -1.147*** -1.417*** -1.531*** -0.823*** -1.005*** -0.889*** 
   initial level (0.068) (0.102) (0.096) (0.068) (0.117) (0.072) (0.057) (0.095) (0.088) (0.090) (0.111) (0.089) (0.090) (0.088) 
Oil net exports 0.092 -0.00723 0.105 -0.0731 -0.316 0.219 0.17 0.171 0.309 0.0949 0.262 -0.326* -0.209** -0.477** 
   per worker initial (0.081) (0.290) (0.155) (0.117) (0.296) (0.200) (0.197) (0.123) (0.215) (0.142) (0.275) (0.191) (0.100) (0.201) 
Years since -0.298*** -0.984*** -0.0896 -0.294** -0.141 -0.377 -0.972*** -0.0684 -0.527* -0.270** -0.944*** 0.234 0.316* 0.369 
  oil discovery peak (0.098) (0.218) (0.552) (0.128) (0.260) (0.346) (0.162) (0.257) (0.316) (0.130) (0.198) (0.266) (0.160) (0.253) 
Years since -0.017 0.402*** 0.497*** 0.770*** 0.406** -1.007*** -1.189*** -0.0741 -0.325*** 0.46 -0.402* 12.53* 0.592 7.084 
  indep. initial (0.041) (0.146) (0.160) (0.099) (0.163) (0.121) (0.125) (0.154) (0.118) (0.290) (0.233) (6.729) (3.051) (5.308) 
Constant 98.62*** 23.66*** 84.21*** 97.87*** 79.20*** 84.26*** 117.8*** 127.8*** 81.88*** 83.00*** 82.06*** 49.65*** 99.88*** -26.24 
 (6.351) (7.856) (9.961) (5.998) (13.420) (9.649) (8.189) (11.120) (9.798) (3.522) (8.337) (9.149) (19.040) (27.850) 
Observations 220 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 310 303 303 
R-squared 0.911 0.747 0.834 0.932 0.731 0.910 0.935 0.914 0.865 0.875 0.743 0.663 0.726 0.694 
                              
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Unbalanced panel estimation with available observations for 140 
countries between the period 1985-2005.  Dependent variable is the 10 year growth rate (difference). All estimations include the initial value of the dependent variable (in levels). 
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Table 6. Estimations with years since oil discovery peak and interaction term of oil discovery peak and oil   
Dependent variable Comp.risk Bur.qua. Corrupt. Law&ord. Democ. Eth. ten. Ext. con. Int. con. Gov. sta. Inv.prof Socio.cond Polity Xrreg Xconst 
Dependent variable -1.181*** -0.873*** -1.096*** -1.126*** -0.959*** -1.166*** -1.124*** -1.359*** -1.156*** -1.437*** -1.507*** -0.833*** -1.016*** -0.896*** 
  initial level (0.069) (0.103) (0.092) (0.069) (0.131) (0.075) (0.060) (0.100) (0.099) (0.094) (0.112) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) 
Years since -0.253** -0.972*** -0.0618 -0.318*** -0.301 -0.276 -0.864*** 0.0555 -0.315* -0.209** -0.799*** 0.0718 0.268 0.112 
  oil discovery peak (0.111) (0.130) (0.487) (0.096) (0.300) (0.250) (0.162) (0.302) (0.160) (0.100) (0.117) (0.284) (0.173) (0.252) 
Oil exports 0.0858 -0.363 -0.467 -0.219 -0.443 0.489*** 0.0905 -0.259 -0.386 0.0473 -0.425 0.16 0.412 -0.0618 
  GDP share initial (0.130) (0.364) (0.386) (0.325) (0.576) (0.183) (0.255) (0.350) (0.369) (0.393) (0.328) (0.484) (0.334) (0.432) 
Interaction -0.0005 -0.0379 -0.0071 -0.011 -0.0232 0.0107 0.00333 -0.0089 0.0176 -0.0058 -0.0399 -0.0186 0.0119 -0.0389 
   (peak*oil) (0.009) (0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.035) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.046) (0.017) (0.046) 
Years since 0.00326 0.360** 0.431*** 0.767*** 0.333** -0.965*** -1.165*** -0.0624 -0.325** 0.517* -0.443* 13.41 0.00717 8.491 
  indep. initial (0.043) (0.155) (0.152) (0.097) (0.168) (0.139) (0.135) (0.167) (0.145) (0.288) (0.226) (8.206) (3.586) (7.028) 
Observations 216 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 300 293 293 
R-squared 0.910 0.751 0.847 0.928 0.728 0.903 0.933 0.908 0.862 0.871 0.739 0.663 0.738 0.690 
Dependent variable -1.187*** -0.901*** -1.099*** -1.131*** -1.015*** -1.158*** -1.093*** -1.331*** -1.163*** -1.446*** -1.396*** -0.844*** -0.972*** -0.908*** 
  initial level (0.060) (0.096) (0.092) (0.067) (0.117) (0.069) (0.054) (0.094) (0.101) (0.088) (0.104) (0.084) (0.100) (0.090) 
Years since -0.426*** -1.227*** 0.556*** -0.389*** -0.26 -0.162 -1.050*** -0.498** -0.12 -0.255** -0.767*** -0.0186 0.056 -0.0367 
  oil discovery peak (0.063) (0.418) (0.126) (0.119) (0.449) (0.257) (0.115) (0.192) (0.286) (0.106) (0.151) (0.285) (0.190) (0.276) 
Oil rents 0.386** -0.543* -0.319** 0.264 -0.636 0.294 0.560*** 0.794* 0.032 -0.174 -0.295 0.352 -0.105 0.272 
  initial (0.154) (0.311) (0.137) (0.215) (0.442) (0.370) (0.134) (0.409) (0.467) (0.249) (0.340) (0.299) (0.228) (0.283) 
Interaction 0.0042 -0.052** 0.0457*** 0.0089 -0.0272 0.0245 0.0105 -0.0137 0.0261 -0.0148 -0.0132 0.0006 -0.0104 -0.0132 
  (peak*oil) (0.007) (0.025) (0.009) (0.011) (0.029) (0.019) (0.009) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.018) 
Years since -0.009 0.343** 0.483*** 0.799*** 0.420** -1.003*** -1.201*** -0.095 -0.293* 0.527* -0.489** -1.225** -0.090 -0.960** 
  indep. initial (0.043) (0.160) (0.149) (0.109) (0.161) (0.141) (0.136) (0.168) (0.170) (0.277) (0.221) (0.500) (0.228) (0.444) 
Observations 238 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 327 313 313 
R-squared 0.909 0.760 0.836 0.920 0.735 0.901 0.936 0.911 0.857 0.878 0.741 0.672 0.722 0.694 
Dependent variable -1.163*** -0.905*** -1.077*** -1.121*** -1.003*** -1.150*** -1.121*** -1.353*** -1.130*** -1.418*** -1.530*** -0.819*** -1.009*** -0.891*** 
  initial level (0.068) (0.102) (0.097) (0.069) (0.118) (0.073) (0.058) (0.096) (0.088) (0.092) (0.112) (0.090) (0.090) (0.088) 
Years since -0.346*** -1.142*** 0.451*** -0.284*** -0.234 -0.127 -1.021*** -0.368** -0.176 -0.284*** -0.886*** 0.438 0.196 0.267 
  oil discovery peak (0.070) (0.331) (0.122) (0.103) (0.384) (0.206) (0.107) (0.142) (0.213) (0.104) (0.153) (0.328) (0.216) (0.251) 
Oil net exports 0.100 0.0201 0.0131 -0.0749 -0.300 0.176 0.179 0.222** 0.253 0.0973 0.252 -0.359* -0.190* -0.461** 
  per worker initial (0.074) (0.274) (0.123) (0.110) (0.276) (0.186) (0.180) (0.110) (0.201) (0.135) (0.257) (0.191) (0.100) (0.197) 
Interaction -0.0048 -0.0156 0.0529*** 0.0010 -0.0092 0.0244** -0.0048 -0.0297*** 0.0322** -0.0015 0.0057 0.0116 -0.0071 -0.0059 
  (peak*oil) (0.005) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) 
Years since -0.0185 0.398*** 0.520*** 0.770*** 0.404** -1.001*** -1.190*** -0.0871 -0.328*** 0.461 -0.401* 12.61* 0.547 7.03 
  indep. initial (0.041) (0.148) (0.154) (0.100) (0.165) (0.126) (0.124) (0.154) (0.123) (0.292) (0.233) (6.643) (3.093) (5.368) 
Observations 220 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 310 303 303 
R-squared 0.911 0.747 0.838 0.932 0.731 0.910 0.935 0.914 0.866 0.875 0.744 0.664 0.727 0.695 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Unbalanced panel estimation with available observations for 140 
countries between the period 1985-2005.  Dependent variable is the 10 year growth rate (difference). All estimations include the initial value of the dependent variable (in levels). Coefficients and 
standard errors for constant not included for purpose of brevity. 
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Table 7. Estimations with interaction term of oil endowment and oil 
Dependent variable Comp.risk Bur.qua. Corrupt. Law&ord. Democ. Eth. ten. Ext. con. Int. con. Gov. sta. Inv.prof Socio.cond Polity Xrreg Xconst 
Dependent variable -1.170*** -0.845*** -1.129*** -1.109*** -0.966*** -1.190*** -1.108*** -1.364*** -1.124*** -1.407*** -1.482*** -0.832*** -1.011*** -0.899*** 
  initial level (0.070) (0.104) (0.096) (0.073) (0.132) (0.072) (0.061) (0.102) (0.099) (0.094) (0.111) (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) 
Oil exports 0.0286 -0.676 -0.617 -0.337 -0.377 0.359** -0.0345 -0.221 -0.4 -0.0872 -0.764** 0.247 0.428 0.107 
  GDP share initial (0.147) (0.436) (0.458) (0.370) (0.663) (0.149) (0.299) (0.426) (0.433) (0.449) (0.313) (0.496) (0.338) (0.459) 
Interaction 0.760* 3.052 2.751** 1.136* -2.435** 3.496* 2.541*** -0.539 0.468 1.785* 3.907*** -0.452 -0.62 -0.312 
   (endowment*oil) (0.400) (1.997) (1.239) (0.577) (1.191) (1.906) (0.676) (1.112) (0.688) (0.973) (1.438) (0.999) (0.523) (1.065) 
Years since 0.00252 0.361** 0.436*** 0.777*** 0.348** -0.978*** -1.167*** -0.0669 -0.320* 0.549** -0.436* 12.65 -0.458 7.014 
  indep. initial (0.042) (0.159) (0.140) (0.096) (0.163) (0.090) (0.097) (0.168) (0.162) (0.239) (0.242) (7.684) (3.510) (6.327) 
Constant 67.43*** 18.23*** 34.57*** 91.01*** 63.34*** 57.29*** 71.99*** 92.13*** 73.62*** 73.67*** 33.43*** 66.64*** 97.66*** 81.96*** 
 (4.344) (3.310) (3.972) (6.200) (6.951) (4.821) (5.497) (8.277) (7.069) (5.140) (5.690) (10.390) (10.210) (9.988) 
Observations 203 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 300 293 293 
R-squared 0.909 0.752 0.840 0.926 0.740 0.903 0.941 0.905 0.860 0.872 0.739 0.662 0.733 0.684 
                
Dependent variable -1.191*** -0.882*** -1.180*** -1.109*** -1.030*** -1.169*** -1.079*** -1.331*** -1.148*** -1.431*** -1.365*** -0.847*** -0.962*** -0.900*** 
  initial level (0.061) (0.095) (0.087) (0.072) (0.116) (0.069) (0.058) (0.100) (0.096) (0.087) (0.105) (0.083) (0.100) (0.090) 
Oil rents 0.224 -0.575* -0.317* 0.149 -0.598 0.19 0.243 0.748** -0.101 -0.112 -0.443 0.278 -0.083 0.253 
  initial (0.164) (0.296) (0.177) (0.220) (0.368) (0.350) (0.287) (0.363) (0.411) (0.220) (0.310) (0.304) (0.220) (0.267) 
Interaction 2.372** -7.674*** -1.133 -0.145 -2.427 -0.39 3.318 -2.181 1.612 -4.682* 0.472 3.581** 1.384 2.853 
   (endowment*oil) (1.178) (2.402) (3.141) (1.426) (5.636) (6.346) (2.368) (4.407) (2.241) (2.739) (4.938) (1.652) (1.036) (2.044) 
Years since 0.00728 0.351** 0.422*** 0.809*** 0.436*** -1.023*** -1.189*** -0.107 -0.288 0.570** -0.473** -1.247** -0.133 -0.986** 
  indep. initial (0.044) (0.155) (0.140) (0.115) (0.158) (0.100) (0.104) (0.176) (0.189) (0.223) (0.219) (0.499) (0.230) (0.438) 
Constant 98.88*** 83.31*** 88.94*** 71.75*** 70.09*** 77.13*** 104.6*** 120.6*** 72.08*** 96.28*** 64.56*** -34.75* 75.76*** -28.05 
 (5.189) (9.253) (8.460) (5.778) (5.720) (5.704) (5.376) (9.227) (6.297) (4.051) (4.378) (18.470) (14.690) (24.940) 
Observations 222 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 327 313 313 
R-squared 0.906 0.763 0.823 0.916 0.741 0.895 0.939 0.906 0.855 0.879 0.735 0.674 0.718 0.694 
                
Dependent variable -1.149*** -0.884*** -1.186*** -1.122*** -1.015*** -1.196*** -1.089*** -1.365*** -1.084*** -1.410*** -1.552*** -0.817*** -0.997*** -0.890*** 
  initial level (0.071) (0.102) (0.087) (0.072) (0.118) (0.073) (0.060) (0.102) (0.084) (0.093) (0.106) (0.088) (0.092) (0.091) 
Oil net exports -0.0365 -0.822*** -0.294* -0.388*** -0.431 -0.136 -0.397* 0.286 0.515 -0.225 -0.521*** -0.399 -0.228 -0.609** 
  per worker initial (0.124) (0.254) (0.159) (0.088) (0.413) (0.280) (0.237) (0.177) (0.441) (0.160) (0.088) (0.291) (0.144) (0.285) 
Interaction 0.206 1.607*** 0.878*** 0.646*** 0.236 0.734* 0.979*** -0.281 -0.622 0.668*** 1.537*** 0.377 0.228 0.663 
   (endowment*oil) (0.169) (0.530) (0.306) (0.156) (0.632) (0.436) (0.296) (0.255) (0.546) (0.236) (0.270) (0.431) (0.208) (0.423) 
Years since -0.0106 0.473*** 0.455*** 0.815*** 0.433*** -0.980*** -1.173*** -0.0774 -0.354*** 0.549** -0.303 12.05* -0.123 6.26 
  indep. initial (0.042) (0.139) (0.134) (0.109) (0.162) (0.094) (0.101) (0.169) (0.133) (0.236) (0.224) (6.334) (3.080) (4.991) 
Constant 106.4*** 161.0*** 134.3*** 125.6*** 106.5*** 146.4*** 134.5*** 115.2*** 54.56** 152.5*** 183.3*** 24.08 86.32*** 57.36*** 
 (13.260) (29.670) (19.140) (13.780) (34.930) (23.820) (16.460) (20.080) (24.410) (12.990) (17.930) (39.660) (9.643) (10.330) 
Observations 205 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 207 309 303 303 
R-squared 0.907 0.761 0.837 0.931 0.735 0.904 0.941 0.907 0.866 0.876 0.747 0.661 0.719 0.691 
                
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Unbalanced panel estimation with available observations for 140 
countries between the period 1985-2005.  Dependent variable is the 10 year growth rate (difference). All estimations include the initial value of the dependent variable (in levels).  
 
